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Abstract— Recently, three key exchange protocols were pro-
posed that integrated the Diffie-Hellman key exchange into the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). It was claimed that the
protocols provide known-key security and unknown key-share
resilience, while the most advanced variant also provides key-
replay resilience. However, we show in this Letter that the
protocols do not provide forward secrecy and key freshness which
are two of the standard security attributes that key exchange
protocols should have. We also fix the protocols such that they
provide these security attributes.
Index Terms— Communication protocols, network security,
Diffie-Hellman, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1993 [1], Arazi integrated the Diffie-Hellman (DH) keyexchange protocol [2] with the digital signature algorithm
(DSA) [3] to achieve mutual authentication of the exchanged
keys. In 1994, Nyberg and Rueppel [4] showed that Arazi’s
proposal did not provide known-key security [5]. In 2004,
Harn et al. [6] improved on Arazi’s concept and presented
3 similar protocols that were shown to provide known-key
security [5] and unknown key-share resilience [5], and the
most advanced variant also provides key-replay resilience [6].
These three security attributes are standard requirements for
any key exchange protocol, but they are not exhaustive.
In fact, as we will show in this Letter, Harn et al.’s protocols
fail to provide two other standard security attributes, namely
forward secrecy [5] and key freshness [5].
II. HARN et al.’S KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS
Let p and q be two primes as in the normal DH case, and
g be an integer where q is a divisor of (p − 1), while g =
h(p−1)/q mod p and g > 1 for some random integer h with
1 < h < p− 1.
The private key of the user, U is a random value xU (0 <
xU < q) while yU = gxU mod p is the corresponding
public key. H(m) denotes a secure hash function on message
m. {p, q, g, yU} are public values. The signature of m is
the pair (r, s) computed as r = ((gk mod p) mod q) and
s = (k−1(H(m) + xUr)) mod q, where k−1 denotes the
multiplicative inverse of k mod q.
Harn et al. [6] proposed three variants of key exchange
protocols that are very similar to each other. In this Letter,
we will concentrate only on the most advanced version (the
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three-round protocol) and how our attacks apply to it since any
successful attack on this version means the other two simpler
ones are also susceptible.
For compactness of description, this protocol is illustrated
in Fig. 1. v and w respectively denote short-term (ephemeral)
secret values chosen by the two parties A and B respectively
for that session.
III. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS
A. No Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy [5] means that if a long-term private key
is exposed, then the secrecy of previous established session
keys should be maintained.
The session key for direction from A to B is computed by
A as:
KAB = yvB mod p, (1)
while it is computed by B as:
KAB = mxBA mod p. (2)
Therefore, when the long-term private key, xB of B is
compromised, an attacker can easily compute any previously
established session key, KAB by (2).
Similarly, the session key for direction from B to A is
computed by A as:
KBA = mxAB mod p, (3)
and computed by B as:
KBA = ywA mod p, (4)
Hence when the long-term private key, xA of A is compro-
mised, an attacker can easily compute KBA by (3).
B. No Key Freshness
Key freshness [5] means that neither party can predetermine
the shared secret key being established.
Again, all three versions of Harn et al.’s protocols do not
provide any key freshness, meaning that both A and B can
predetermine the shared secret key being established. This is
true as follows.
A computes KAB via (1), which depends on B′s public
key, yB known by A all the time, and a random secret value,
v chosen by A.
Therefore, A could have decided that KAB must be equal
to a predetermined value, namely KAB = yvB mod p where
v was chosen at that point of time in the past. At any later
time, whenever A wishes for KAB to be that predetermined
value, he simply uses that previously chosen v in forming the
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Step User A User B
1. Select random integer, v.
mA = gv mod p.
−→ mA
2. Select random integer, w.
KBA = ywA mod p.
KAB = mxBA mod p.
mB = gw mod p.
rB = mB mod q.
sB = (w−1 × (H(mB ||KBA||KAB) + xBrB)) mod q.
←− mB , sB
3. KAB = yvB mod p.
KBA = mxAB mod p.
rB = mB mod q.
Verify DSA signature (rB , sB) of message mB .
rA = mA mod q.
sA = (v−1 × (H(mA||KAB ||KBA) + xArA)) mod q.
−→ sA
4. rA = mA mod q.
Verify DSA signature (rA, sA) of message mA.
Fig. 1. Three-round protocol
Step User A User B
1. Select random integer, v.
mA = gv mod p.
nA = yvA mod p.
−→ mA, nA
2. Select random integer, w.
KBA = nwA mod p = g
xAvw mod p.
KAB = mxBwA mod p = g
xBvw mod p.
mB = gw mod p.
nB = ywB mod p.
rB = mB mod q.
sB = (w−1 × (H(mB ||KBA||KAB) + xBrB)) mod q.
←− mB , nB , sB
3. KAB = nvB mod p = gxBvw mod p.
KBA = mxAvB mod p = g
xAvw mod p.
rB = mB mod q.
Verify DSA signature (rB , sB) of message mB .
rA = mA mod q.
sA = (v−1 × (H(mA||KAB ||KBA) + xArA)) mod q.
−→ sA
4. rA = mA mod q.
Verify DSA signature (rA, sA) of message mA.
Fig. 2. Fixed three-round protocol
mA = gv mod p to B. This will cause KAB to be equal to
the predetermined value, yvB .
Similarly, B computes KBA via (4) and so he could choose
this to be equal to any predetermined value, KBA = ywA mod p
by using a previously chosen value of w in forming his
message mB to A.
A and B therefore can predetermine at a certain time in the
past, what a future session key, KAB and KBA respectively
would be equal to.
As an aside, note that if A or B do this, then they are
putting the confidentiality of their long-term private key at
risk. This is because doing so will necessitate two different
DSA signatures to be generated using the same random value
− this is known to have an associated risk of key compromise,
if any other party spots this.
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IV. FIXING THE PROTOCOLS
We can fix the protocols so that both forward secrecy and
key freshness can be guaranteed, while preserving the basic
essence of the original protocols. This is shown in Fig. 2.
The main idea is to ensure the computations of the two
session keys, KAB and KBA depend on the ephemeral secrets,
v and w chosen by both parties A and B.
This provides forward secrecy because even if the long-
term private key of any party is exposed, previous session
keys cannot be computed since the ephemeral secrets, v and
w for that session are unknown.
This fix also provides key freshness because every session
key is a function of ephemeral secrets chosen by both parties,
so neither party can predetermine a session key’s value since
he would not know what the other party’s ephemeral secret is
going to be.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the most advanced version of Harn et
al.’s three key exchange protocols fails to provide two standard
security criteria that are required of any key exchange protocol,
namely forward secrecy and key freshness, and it is easy to
extend the result to all three versions proposed by them [6]. We
have also shown how to fix the protocols to provide forward
secrecy and key freshness.
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